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Standfirst: Flaws in the Department of Health’s interim evaluation of an alcohol industry pledge to 
remove one billion alcohol units from the market mean the report should be withdrawn, the 
evaluation approach reviewed and revised targets set for the pledge argue John Holmes and 
colleagues. 
  
The UK Government’s 2012 Alcohol Strategy contained a number of evidence-based policy 
proposals, including minimum unit pricing.1 However, few of these policies have been implemented.  
Instead, the Government has increasingly pointed to an alcohol industry pledge to remove one 
billion units from the alcohol market as a demonstration of what can be achieved via voluntary deals 
with industry.2  For example, the Billion Unit pledge was the only alcohol intervention mentioned in 
the Department of Health (DoH) report Living Well for Longer in July 2014.3 
The pledge by 33 alcohol producers, retailers and trade organisations began in 2012 and was 
announced as part of the Public Health Responsibility Deal; the UK Government’s flagship public 
health policy.4  Under the Responsibility Deal, industry partners make individual or collective pledges 
to undertake activities ostensibly addressing public health problems.  Such voluntary agreements are 
argued by the Government to be preferable to costly and cumbersome regulatory approaches.  The 
Billion Unit pledge committed signatories to “remove one billion units of alcohol sold annually from 
the market by December 2015, principally through improving consumer choice of lower alcohol 
products”.5   
In practice, this means that the alcoholic strength of some beverages will be reduced and new 
beverages branded as low or no alcohol will be developed and promoted by industry.  However, the 
evidence base for achieving public health gains by promoting reduced strength alcohol is limited.6  In 
theory, if consumers simply replace higher strength products with lower strength alternatives, 
overall alcohol consumption and associated harm will fall.  However there is little evidence to 
support this hypothesis.  Consumers may also ignore the new products or drink them in addition to 
pre-existing consumption.   
This potential for higher consumption prompts legitimate questions regarding industry motives for 
focusing on making lower strength drinks available to consumers.  It has been reported that 
consumer tastes have shifted away from high-strength products and that brewers are keen to attract 
women, who are perceived to prefer lower ABV drinks.7;8  These trends were acknowledged in the 
press release announcing the deal9 and invite the question of whether new low strength products 
are primarily designed to reduce  alcohol consumption, simply reflect what consumers want, or seek 
to  increase consumption in new drinkers.  Is manufacturer motivation driven by public health 
concern or commerce?  
 
2014 DoH evaluation of progress towards the pledge 
The Responsibility Deal website says that for the Billion Unit pledge to be judged a success the 
annual number of units of alcohol sold across the UK must be reduced by at least one billion 
(equivalent to a 2% reduction from 2011 levels).  It also says that the reduction must be shown to 
result from the pledge.10  This second aspect is the more challenging to demonstrate.   
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In December 2014, the DoH produced their second interim report on progress towards meeting the 
Billion Unit pledge and concluded that its target had been exceeded two years early as 1.3 billion 
units had been removed from the market as a result of the pledge between 2011 and 2013.11 
However, whilst the headline finding is appealing, a closer look at the analyses and data which 
underpin it raises questions.  We believe the data used in the analysis may not be fit for purpose 
rendering the headline estimate inaccurate. We also believe that the report makes simplistic 
assumptions about consumer responses to the pledge and takes insufficient notice of confounding 
factors, which means that it is unclear whether any change in alcohol consumption is truly 
attributable to the pledge.  In this article and the accompanying online technical appendix we 
explain why.  We conclude that the DoH should give urgent consideration to withdrawing the report, 
revising its evaluation approach and modifying the targets associated with the pledge.  
 
Problems with the DoH interim report  
The data may be unfit for purpose 
DoH’s interim evaluation draws on two data sources.  HMRC excise duty (alcohol tax) data on 
alcoholic drinks measure how much alcohol is sold in the UK in any given year.12  Beer and spirits are 
taxed relative to their alcohol content making this a reasonable source of information for quantifying 
sales of these drinks.  However, wine and ciders are taxed by volume of product irrespective of 
strength.13  This means tax data do not provide information on the number of alcohol units in the 
market for wine and cider.   
Therefore, additional market research data on alcohol retail sales in Great Britain were also used to 
estimate quantities of wine and cider sold.14  But the estimated volume of alcoholic drink sold in 
these data is 9% lower in 2011 than the equivalent estimate from HMRC and 14% lower in 2013; for 
example due to limited information on discount retailers and the exclusion of Northern Ireland.11;14  
This increase in the discrepancy over time is important as it is larger than the claimed effect of the 
pledge – a 1.3 billion (or 2.6%) reduction in units sold.  We show in the technical appendix that a 
proportion of this effect could be due to the discrepancy between data sources.   
In the appendix we also present a case that that 870 million of the 1.3 billion units removed from the 
market are accounted for by a change in 2011 to the way HMRC recorded beer data, rather than the 
pledge.  As DoH do not take steps to address these data problems, we conclude that the estimated 
impact of the pledge may be invalid irrespective of our other concerns.   
 
Only one consumer response is considered 
The DoH analysis assumes that people will respond to lower strength drinks by consuming the same 
amount of beer or wine but at a lower strength (a lower percentage alcohol by volume or %ABV).  
However this may not be the case and we believe that this simplistic approach is flawed.   
Three outcome measures are used in the DoH report drawn from a mixture of the HMRC and market 
research data: (1) the total annual volume of a beverage sold; (2) the percentage of that volume 
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which is pure alcohol (%ABV) and (3) the number of alcohol units sold (1 unit = 10ml or 8g of pure 
alcohol). These outcomes are obtained for five categories of beverage (beer, cider, wine, spirits and 
alcopops) and fed into a before and after analysis comparing 2011 with 2013. Table 1 shows how the 
data sources are combined to give the outcome for each beverage type. The before and after 
analysis is shown in Table 2 and is based on the equation below.   
Change in units sold = (2013 %ABV x 2011 volume of beverage) – (2011 %ABV x 2011 volume of 
beverage)    
Using this equation, the online technical appendix provides worked examples of consumer response 
scenarios different to the one assumed by the evaluation.  These demonstrate that DoH’s analysis 
can produce results suggesting that the policy led to reduced consumption even when consumption 
actually increased. 
 
A change in the analysis plan 
The analytical approach was altered following the resignation of public health stakeholders from the 
Responsibility Deal Alcohol Monitoring and Evaluation Group. The change meant that the headline 
measure of the pledge’s success was based on analysing all beverages separately then adding up the 
results, rather than analysing all beverages together (Personal Communication: Professor Mark 
Bellis, 2014). DoH do not acknowledge this change in the report but explain the use of a beverage-
specific analysis by arguing that this controls for underlying trends and confounding in the market 
share of each beverage type: 
“Some of the change in the total volume of pure alcohol that occurs from year to year is due 
to changes in the category shares. For example, as the average abv of beer is lower than the 
average abv of wine, a shift in market share from beer to wine would (other things being 
equal) result in an increase in the total volume of pure alcohol and an increase in the overall 
average abv. By holding constant the volume of products the change in the number of units 
driven solely by changes in abv can be calculated.”11 p.10-11 
This methodological change makes a difference.  In the first interim report produced by the DoH 
they found 253 million units had been removed from the market; however, had the original method 
been used, it would have concluded that the pledge led to 359 million units being added to the 
market.  In the second report analysis by beverage type made little difference.  
 
Confounders are inadequately considered 
The only consideration given in the report to potential sources of confounding is to the market share 
of each beverage type.  However, there are others important sources of confounding that DoH does 
not control for.     
The following three confounders are likely to affect the number of units sold over time. Robustly 
separating the impact of the pledge from these factors requires a careful and detailed statistical 
analysis which the report does not provide.     
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First, increased taxes on high-strength beer and reduced taxes on low-strength beer were 
introduced in 2011.  Lower taxes for low-strength beer mean these products can be sold more 
cheaply or more profit can be made if they are sold at the same price as other beers.  Given this 
incentive to producers and consumers, sales of these products are likely to have increased 
irrespective of whether the pledge was made or not.   
Second, the estimated annual number of units of alcohol sold in the UK fell by 18% between 
2004/05 and 2012/13.15  This trend has not been uniform across the population or across types of 
alcoholic beverage.  For example, there have been long-term shifts in consumption from beer to 
wine, and from drinking by younger people to drinking by older people.  These shifts affect the 
volume of each beverage type sold over time and the total amount of alcohol sold.16;17  
Finally, the average strength of products has not been stable over time; the average alcohol content 
of beer sold fell from 4.57% in 2000 to 4.48% in 2010.16   
 
A better approach  
The above critique does not imply the Billion Unit pledge is necessarily bad for public health, simply 
that it may be too challenging to evaluate whether the target has been met. The DoH evaluation 
plan stipulated that any reduction in alcohol sales must be shown to result from the pledge.  Until 
these problems of data, plausible consumer responses and confounding (summarised in Table 3) 
have been addressed we question the validity of the conclusion that 1.3 billion units have been 
removed from the market as a result of the pledge alone.   
It is not clear whether a robust quantitative evaluation of the Billion Unit pledge can be conducted 
based on the data that are currently available.  Individual-level longitudinal data on alcohol 
consumption with sufficient detail to allow analysis of changes in the products consumers purchase 
and whether new lower strength products substitute for or add to existing consumption, would be 
ideal.  To our knowledge, such data are unavailable and are not being collected by DoH.   
In the absence of these data what are the alternatives? We believe that greater onus should instead 
be placed on process evaluations which assess whether producers’ behaviour and products have 
changed in a way and to a scale likely to facilitate healthier drinking habits.  This may include, for 
example, reporting on what specific products have been introduced or altered in strength with 
accompanying %ABVs, and supplying sales data for these products.  Currently provision of such data 
is voluntary and many signatories make more generalised claims.  For example, Barcardi Brown-
Forman Brands (who make Bacardi rum, Jack Daniel’s whiskey and Southern Comfort liqueur) state 
in their progress report: “The ABV on some products has been reduced and new products at a lower 
ABV than the parents’ brands have been introduced.”18   
Again, although it is unlikely to quantify progress towards the pledge, independent market research 
could also be used to understand how consumers are responding to new and revised products, in 
particular detailing who is buying these products and whether they are substituting for and adding 
to existing drinking.   
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We recommend the billion unit target is abandoned in favour of measurable alternatives.  We also 
recommend that DoH withdraw the 2014 interim report, request stakeholders no longer cite its 
conclusions and conduct a review and revision of the evaluation approach.   
 KEY MESSAGES BOX: 
 The responsibility deal  includes a pledge from the alcohol industry to remove one billion 
units from the market and is the UK’s central alcohol policy 
 The Department of Health’s interim evaluation of its success makes questionable 
assumptions and ignores key confounding factors. 
 We call for the report to be withdrawn 
 A robust quantitative evaluation may not possible  
 The billion unit target should be dropped in favour of measurable alternatives 
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Table 1: Data sources for DoH interim report by alcoholic beverage type 
Beverage Volume sold Average ABV Units of alcohol sold 
Beer HMRC Calculated
2
 HMRC 
 
Cider HMRC Nielsen/CGA Calculated
2
 
Wine HMRC Nielsen/CGA Calculated
2
 
Spirits and RTDs
1 
Calculated
2
 Nielsen/CGA HMRC 
1
RTDs are ready-to-drink pre-mixed spirits – also known as alcopops. 
2
Data calculated from two of volume sold, ABV and units of alcohol sold.  
 
 
Table 3: Summary of factors affecting the DoH’s interim evaluation of the Billion Units pledge  
Factors affecting the estimate of how many units have 
been removed from the market 
Accounted 
for by DoH 
Direction of effect on estimate of 
units removed from the market 
Change in HMRC recording practises for beer No Increase 
Multiple possible consumer responses to lower strength 
products 
No Unknown 
Changes in the accuracy of %ABVs for most beverage types No Unknown 
Factors affecting whether the estimate of units removed 
from the market is attributable to the Billion Unit pledge.  
Accounted 
for by DoH 
Direction of effect on estimate of 
units removed from the market 
Reduction in lower strength beer taxes No Increase 
Long-term downward trend in %ABV of beer No Increase 
Table 2: Results from Department of Health Billion Units pledge Interim Report 
 Beer Cider Wine Spirits RTDs Total 
2011       
Volume of product (hectolitres)
 
42.5m 9.3m 13.3m 2.9m 1.5m 69.6m 
Average ABV 4.4% 5.0% 12.9% 36.8% 4.5% 7.5% 
Volume of pure alcohol (units sold)
1
 18.7bn 4.6bn 17.2bn 10.8bn 0.7bn 52.2bn 
2013       
Volume of product (hectolitres)
 
42.4m 8.6m 13.2m 2.9m 1.9m 69.0m 
Average ABV 4.1% 4.8% 12.9% 36.9% 4.4% 7.3% 
Volume of pure alcohol (units sold)
1
 17.4bn 4.1bn 17.0bn 10.6bn 0.8bn 50.4bn 
2013 ABVs applied to 2011 product volume       
Volume of pure alcohol (units)
1
 17.4bn 4.5bn 17.2bn 10.9bn 0.7bn 50.6bn 
Estimated change in units resulting from 
ABV decrease
2 -1.2bn -0.1bn -0.0bn +0.0bn -0.0bn -1.3bn 
1 
2011 and 2013 data are not provided by Department of Health and are calculated here using average ABV and 
volume of product data.  
2
 ABV estimates are given by Department of Health to one decimal place; however, estimated changes in units 
are highly sensitive to precision of ABVs (e.g. a 0.01% increase in 2011 average beer ABV would increase the 
estimated reduction in beer units by approximately 40 million).  Consequently, the results obtained by the 
Department of Health cannot be reproduced exactly using the data provided in the report which is replicated 
here 
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Long-term downward trend in consumption No Unknown 
Changing market share of beverage types Yes  Unknown 
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